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Non-technical Summary
Economic theory suggests that financing constraints may occur due to capital market im-
perfections. These particularly affect investments in innovation projects as such projects
are typically characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, complexity and specificity.
Financing innovation externally is thus likely to be more costly compared to financing of
other investment. Hence, internal sources of financing are crucial for the implementation
of innovation projects. However, internal funds are not inexhaustible either. They are
naturally limited and raising new equity may be costly and often undesired. Financing
constraints, however, may not affect all firms to the same extent. This paper addresses the
question of which firms face financing constraints. Such identification is particularly inter-
esting for policy makers in order to design effective policy schemes as financing constraints
lead to a suboptimal level of investment in innovation.
In contrast to previous empirical studies, our analysis is based on the idea of an ideal
test for identifying financial constraints on investment in innovation as proposed by Hall
(2008). She suggests that 'the ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity con-
straints on investment is to give firms additional cash exogenously, and observe whether
they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment and/or R&D. [. . . ] If they choose
the second [alternative], then the firm must have had some unexploited investment op-
portunities that were not profitable using more costly external finance'. That is, these
firms have been financially constrained. This study contributes to the literature in the
following three main aspects. First, we employ a direct indicator derived from survey
information in which firms were offered a hypothetical cash payment. Second, we account
for the firm's choice between alternatives of use for the money. Third, we introduce the
concept of innovative capability and how it affects financing constraints for innovation.
The results from our econometric analysis show that financial constraints for innovation
do not depend on the availability of funds per se, but are driven by innovative capability
through increasing resource requirements. That is, firms with high innovative capability
but low financial resources are more likely constrained than others. Yet, we also observe
constraints for financially sound firms that may have to put some of their ideas on the
shelf. Firms with low innovative capability choose other options, such as investment in
physical capital. Taking account of all options for usage of the additional money, we
further find in contrast to the innovation decision, the decision to serve debt is to a
large extent driven by the financial background. Firms with low internal funds or a bad
credit rating would primarily repay debt instead of investing additional cash in innovation
projects.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Unvollkommenen Kapitalmärkte führen dazu, dass sich Unternehmen Einschränkungen
bei der Finanzierung von Investitionsvorhaben gegenübersehen. Unzureichender Zugang
zu Finanzierungsquellen kann insbesondere bei Investitionen in Innovationsprojekte eine
Rolle spielen, da Innovationsprojekte im Allgemeinen durch einen hohen Grad an Unsi-
cherheit, Komplexität und Spezifität gekennzeichnet sind. Die externe Finanzierung von
Innovationsprojekten ist daher - sofern verfügbar - vergleichsweise teuer. Unternehmen
sind bei der Finanzierung von Innovationsprojekten daher auf interne Mittel angewiesen,
wenngleich diese ebenfalls nicht unbegrenzt zur Verfügung stehen.
Theoretische Überlegungen zeigen, dass projekt- und unternehmensspezifische Faktoren
Finanzierungsrestriktionen beeinflussen, sodass zu erwarten ist, dass nicht alle Unterneh-
men im gleichen Ausmaß davon betroffen sind. Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit
der Identifizierung restringierter Firmen. Die Identifizierung ist für politische Entschei-
dungsträger von besonderem Interesse bei der Gestaltung effektiver Politikmaßnahmen
zur Förderung von Innovationstätigkeiten.
Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Literatur basiert die vorliegende Studie auf der Idee eines von
Hall (2008) vorgeschlagenen idealen Tests zur Identifizierung restringierter Unternehmen.
Die Idee des Tests besteht darin, Unternehmen zusätzliche Mittel frei zur Verfügung zu-
stellen. Werden die zusätzlichen Mittel für Innovationsprojekte anstelle von anderen Ver-
wendungsmöglichkeiten (Rücklagen, Investitionen, Ausschüttung, Schuldenrückzahlung)
eingesetzt, kann daraus der Rückschluss gezogen werden, dass das Unternehmen bisher
aufgrund mangelnder Finanzierung Innovationsprojekte nicht durchführen konnte.
Die vorliegende Studie leistet einen Beitrag zur bestehenden Literatur in dreierlei Hinsicht.
Erstens verwenden wir einen neuen, direkten Indikator zur Identifizierung restringierter
Unternehmen. Zweitens berücksichtigen wir in der Innovationsentscheidung alternative
Verwendungsmöglichkeiten für zusätzliche liquide Mittel. Drittens führen wir das Konzept
der Innovationskapazität in seiner Rolle für Finanzierungsrestriktionen ein.
Die Ergebnisse der ökonometrischen Analyse zeigen, dass Finanzierungsrestriktionen nicht
per se durch die Verfügbarkeit von finanziellen Mittel abhängen, sondern in entscheidenem
Maße von der Innovationskapazität der Unternehmen beeinflusst werden. Unternehmen
mit vergleichsweise hoher Innovationskapazität und geringen liquiden Mitteln sind zwar
am wahrscheinlichsten von Finanzierungsrestriktionen betroffen, gleichwohl sind auch Un-
ternehmen mit hoher Innovationskapazität und solidem finanziellen Hintergrund finanzi-
ell restringiert. Unternehmen mit geringer Innovationskapazität wählen dagegen andere
Verwendungszwecke für die zusätzlichen liquiden Mittel, z.B. Investitionen in Sachkapi-
tal. Die Berücksichtigung aller Verwendungsalternativen zeigt darüber hinaus, dass die
Entscheidung Schulden zurückzuzahlen vor allem von der eigenen finanziellen Ressour-
cenausstattung abhängt. Das bedeutet, dass Unternehmen mit geringen internen Mitteln
oder einer niedrigen Kreditwürdigkeit die zusätzlichen Mittel zunächst zur Begleichung
von Schulden einsetzen.
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1 Introduction
In the current financial and economic crisis both policy and industry fear the deterioration
of firms' financing conditions for investments. This is particularly relevant for innovation
projects. Independently of any financial crisis, economic theory stresses that financing
constraints may occur due to imperfections on capital markets. Most importantly, infor-
mation asymmetries may affect investments in innovation projects as these are typically
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, complexity and specificity which make it
difficult for outsiders to judge the projects' potential value. Moreover, firms may be re-
luctant to reveal details of innovation projects to potential investors. Therefore, financing
innovation externally may be more costly compared to external financing of other in-
vestment (Meyer and Kuh 1957, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Anton and Yao 2002). Hence,
internal sources of financing are crucial for the implementation of innovation projects
(Leland and Pyle 1977, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, 1992, Himmelberg and
Petersen 1994). In turn, internal funds are not inexhaustible either. Cash flow is natu-
rally limited and raising new equity may be costly and often unwanted (Carpenter and
Petersen 2002).
Financing constraints, however, may not affect all firms to the same extent. This paper
addresses the question of which firms face financing constraints. Such identification is
particularly interesting for policy makers in order to design effective policy schemes as
financing constraints lead to a suboptimal level of investment in innovation. In contrast to
previous empirical studies which tested the presence of financing constraints indirectly by
the sensitivity of R&D investment to changes in internal funds, we take a direct approach.
It is based on the idea of an ideal test for identifying financial constraints on investment
in innovation as proposed by Hall (2008). She suggests that 'the ideal experiment for
identifying the effects of liquidity constraints on investment is to give firms additional cash
exogenously, and observe whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment
and/or R&D. [. . . ] If they choose the second [alternative], then the firm must have had
some unexploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using more costly
external finance'. That is, these firms had been financially constrained.
This study contributes to the literature in three main aspects. First, we employ a direct
indicator derived from survey information. Firms were asked to imagine that they receive
additional cash exogenously and to indicate how they would spend it. Thus, we directly
observe whether firms choose to invest either all or part of the cash in innovation projects.
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Second, we account for the firm's choice between alternative uses of the money in our
econometric analysis. Such an approach is crucial as investing in innovation projects
competes with other purposes of firms' available funds. Third, we introduce the concept
of innovative capability and how it affects financing constraints for innovation. To the best
of our knowledge, this fundamental aspect of a firm's innovation process has attracted
little attention in this strand of literature so far.
The results from our econometric analysis show that financial constraints do not depend on
the availability of internal funds per se, but that they are driven by innovative capability
through increasing resource requirements. That is, firms with high innovative capability
but low financial resources are most likely to be constrained. We also observe constraints
for financially sound firms that may have to put some of their ideas on the shelf. Firms
with low innovative capability choose other options. Taking account of all options for
using additional money, the multidimensional analysis reveals some further interesting
results. For example, firms with a bad credit rating would primarily repay debt.
This article reviews previous literature in section 2. Section 3 describes the theoreti-
cal framework of our study and sets out the role of innovative capability for financing
constraints. The data and econometric model specifications as well the results from the
different models are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Financing Constraints for Innovation: What do we
know?
2.1 Theoretical Arguments for Financing Constraints
In principle, there are two sources for financing innovation projects. External sources
include bank loans or other debt contracts whereas internal sources basically originate
from retained profits or (new) equity. Firms decide upon their optimal levels of investment
while choosing their capital structure in such a way as to minimize long run cost of
capital. Only in a neo-classical world with frictionless markets sources of financing would
not matter. In their seminal article Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in markets
characterized by no taxes, no bankruptcy costs and no asymmetric information investment
decisions are indifferent to capital structure.
However, starting with the work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) numerous articles
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have elaborated on reasons illustrating why the source of financing matters and why it
particularly matters for investments in the creation of knowledge. If capital markets are
imperfect and information asymmetries influence lending and investment decisions, the
cost of different kinds of capital may vary by type of investment (Meyer and Kuh 1957,
Leland and Pyle 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984).
Investment in innovation compared to other types of investments is characterized by a
high degree of asymmetric information between the parties involved. Complexity and
specificity of innovation projects make it difficult for outsiders to judge their potential
value. Moreover, firms may be reluctant to reveal details of the projects to potential
investors for competition reasons (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss
1984, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Anton and Yao 2002). Lenders or investors therefore
demand a 'premium' on their required rate of return in the sense of Akerlof (1970). If
no pursuant rate of return can be appropriated, investors ration their investment or even
refrain from investing at all (Stiglitz 1985).
In addition, moral hazard problems between firm management and outsiders, such as
investors or lenders, as well as information asymmetries between management and owners
may impact financing conditions and, hence, investment in innovation projects (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, Grossman and Hart 1982, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004b).
Besides information asymmetries, the intangible nature of the asset that is being created
by innovation usually makes external fund raising more costly for such projects than for
other types of investment. A large fraction of innovation investment, particularly R&D,
is sunk and cannot be redeployed (Alderson and Betker 1996). Debt holders such as
banks prefer physical and redeployable assets as security for their loans since they can
be liquidated in case of project failure or bankruptcy. Moreover, serving debt requires a
stable cash flow which makes financing of innovation projects by external sources more
difficult, since most of these projects do not immediately lead to success. In addition,
serving debt reduces cash flow for future investments (Hall 1990, 2002).
There is a whole branch of theoretical and empirical literature illustrating that firms in-
deed first and foremost use internal funds to finance innovation projects (as compared
to debt) indicating a gap in the respective cost of capital (Leland and Pyle 1977, Bhat-
tacharya and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, Hall 1992, Himmelberg and Peterson 1994, Bougheas,
Görg and Strobl 2003, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2009b). Internal funds, however, are
naturally limited and raising new equity may be costly and often unwanted. Consequently,
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the extent to which financial constraints are binding depends on the firms' ability to raise
external or internal funds under the conditions of imperfect capital markets.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Measuring and identifying financial constraints represents a main challenge in empirical
studies. Since the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) econometric
studies have tried to detect financial constraints by analyzing investments' sensitivities
to changes in available financial resources, most often cash-flow. This methodology has
subsequently been applied to investment in research and development as it constitutes an
important share of total innovation investments. The conjecture for investment in R&D
was derived accordingly: the more sensitive firms' R&D investment to cash flow the more
binding are financial constraints. Excess sensitivities were regarded as indirectly reflecting
firms' lack of access to the credit market.
The theoretical literature states that asymmetric information, moral hazard in borrower-
lender relationships, intra-firm organizational structures and other institutional factors
may lead to financial constraints. This implies that financing constraints depend on
certain project and firm characteristics. In order to observe more than an average ef-
fect over the entire range of different firms when trying to detect financing constraints,
researchers thus usually split their sample or focus on a particular group of firms a
priori.1 Frequently investigated factors impacting financial constraints for R&D are
firm size in terms of number of employees or assets and firm age (Himmelberg and
Peterson 1994, Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and Udell 2002, Czarnitzki 2006, Czar-
nitzki and Hottenrott 2009b), governance structures (Chung and Wright 1998, Czarnitzki
and Kraft 2004a), industry patterns (Hall 1992, Bloch 2005) as well as financial market
regimes (Bhagat and Welch 1995, Hall, Mairesse, Branstetter and Crepon 1999, Mulkay,
Hall and Mairesse 2001, Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen 2006, Baum, Schaefer and
Talavera 2009). Empirical studies - primarily focusing on manufacturing industries -
however, have not always provided unambiguous results. Hall (1992) and Himmelberg
and Peterson (1994) find a positive relationship between R&D activity and cash flow
for US firms. Mulkay et al. (2001) show that cash flow seems to be more important in
1That is, firms are grouped into supposedly more and less constrained firms. The latter were expected
to be able to raise funds for any investment. Hence, investment spending should not turn out to be
sensitive to the availability of internal funds. The former group of potentially constrained firms is expected
to show a positive relationship between investment and the availability of financial resources that reveals
the existence of liquidity constraints.
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the US than in France for any type of investment. Bond et al. (2006) detect that cash
flow determines whether a UK firm does R&D, but not how much. This may indicate
that R&D performing firms are a self-selected group of firms that are not constrained.
However, they do not find such a relationship for Germany. In contrast, Harhoff (1998)
confirms a positive sensitivity to cash flow for German manufacturing firms. In a similar
vein, a negative association between debt and R&D activity was reported for US but not
for Japanese firms by Bhagat and Welch (1995). For US and UK firms they observe a
positive correlation between stock return and R&D activity two years later. Yet, they
do not observe any relationship between cash flow and R&D. Bougheas et al. (2003) find
similar results for Ireland.
Empirical evidence further shows that older and bigger companies are less restricted than
younger and smaller firms. This may reflect that established firms can innovate by build-
ing on their previous innovations, e.g. by product differentiation or improvement, while
younger firms need to conduct more R&D which requires more resources and is much
more uncertain. Young firms may be furthermore restricted in their R&D investment
due to lower equity (Müller and Zimmermann 2006). Likewise, problems of asymmetric
information may be less severe for older firms that have established a long and stable
relationship with their bank. Young firms, on the other hand, have not yet built such
a relationship (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and Udell 2002). This may aggravate
their financing constraints since they cannot yet rely on internal funds resulting from cash
inflow from former products either. Finally, bank financing of innovation projects may be
particularly limited for young firms because of their overall higher default risk. Currently,
this problem presumably deteriorates as the financial crisis requires banks to conduct an
even more detailed risk assessment in the future.
Most existing empirical studies suffer from limitations in data availability. Many of them
look at either rather large firms listed at stock markets or at small firms only. More
severe limitations arise from the conceptual set-up. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)
first questioned whether the relationship between cash flow and investment is a sufficient
indication of financial constraints (see also Cleary 1999, Fazzari et al. 2000 and Aydogan
2003). Especially in the case of large firms, free cash flow levels may be determined by
accounting as well as dividend policies aimed at mitigating moral hazard problems (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, Dhanani 2005). Additionally, a positive relationship
between investment and cash flow may simply reflect that both of them correlate with
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promising market demand. Finally, firms tend to smooth R&D spending over time (Hall,
Griliches and Hausman 1986, Lach and Schankerman 1988). This leads to difficulties in
measuring the impact of changes in cash in one period on subsequent investments.
As an alternative, recent studies investigate firms' access to external funds more di-
rectly through the analysis of standardized credit ratings (Czarnitzki 2006, Czarnitzki
and Hottenrott 2009b) or credit requests (Piga and Atzeni 2007). The main concern
using credit requests relates to a selectivity problem as those firms that are constrained
most may not expect to get external funding may therefore not ask for it. Aghion,
Askenazy, Berman, Cette and Eymard (2008) measure credit restrictions based on a di-
rect indicator derived from repayments of trade credits. Using French firm-level data
they show that the share of R&D investment over total investment is counter-cyclical
without credit constraints, but is less counter-cyclical as firms face tighter credit con-
straints. Moreover, the increased availability of rich and comprehensive survey data
on innovation activities at the firm level has enabled researchers to adopt more di-
rect approaches towards the identification of potentially financially constrained firms
(Canepa and Stoneman 2002, Savignac 2008, Tiwari, Mohnen, Palm and Schim van der
Loeff 2007).2 These studies define financially constrained firms as those which innovation
projects were hampered by the lack of finance. Canepa and Stoneman (2002) compare
inter-country differences in Europe and find a higher perceived importance of financing
constraints on innovation for firms in high-tech sectors and for smaller firms in market-
based systems. Savignac (2008) corroborates that the probability of financing constraints
decreases with firm size and depends on the firms' ex-ante financing structure. Tiwari
et al. (2007) analyze both the impact of perceived financing restrictions and other con-
straints - such as market uncertainty and regulation - on R&D investment. They confirm
that financially constrained firms spend less on R&D. Surprisingly, they find financial
constraints to be less binding if firms face other hampering factors as well.
Yet, survey-based studies that ask firms whether the lack of finance impedes their innova-
tion activities are not without limitations either. They neglect that the option of investing
in innovation projects competes with alternative uses of available funds, as stressed in the
financial literature. That is, firms simultaneously determine their level of innovation in-
vestment, capital investment, dividends, debt payments as well as retentions.3 Moreover,
2The Oslo-Manual defines innovation indicators and sets outs guidelines for surveying them (OECD
and Eurostat 2005), first published in 1992. The collection of innovation survey data in most OECD
countries is guided by this manual. In Europe they are called the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS).
3Grabowski and Mueller (1972) and Gugler (2003) simultaneously investigate the determinants of
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none of the empirical studies consider the role of innovative capability. Financial con-
straints may not only depend on the availability of internal funds per se, but may be
driven by the firm's ability to generate ideas for innovation projects and to turn ideas
into marketable products or new technologies and hence by its resource requirements.
3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In order to establish a general understanding of financing constraints, we draw from a
simple model by Howe and McFetridge (1976) and David, Hall and Toole (2000).4 We
employ it to explore how innovative capability affects financing constraints for innovation.
In this setting, it is assumed that in each planning period firm i has a certain set of ideas for
innovation projects.5 This set of projects is determined by the firm's innovative capability
(ICi), that is, its ability to generate and pursue new innovation project ideas. The firm
ranks these projects according to their expected rate of return in descending order. This
results in a downward sloping demand function (Di) for innovation financing that reflects
the marginal rate of return (MRRi) of firm i6. The marginal rate of return depends on
the level of innovation expenditure (Ii), on the innovative capability (ICi) as well as on
other firm and industry characteristics (Xi):
MRRi = f(Ii, ICi, Xi).
Profit-maximizing firm i invests in innovation up to the point where the marginal rate of
return equals the marginal cost of capital (MCCi). The marginal cost of capital varies
with the size of the investment and reflects the opportunity costs of investing funds in
innovation. This implies that MCCi also depends on the expected returns of other uses
of available funds such as investment in tangible or financial assets (summarized in Re,oi )
as well as on the amount of firms' internal funds (IFi). In imperfect capital markets
costs of external capital are assumed to be higher than those of internal funds as lenders
require a risk premium for instance due to information asymmetries. Marginal capital
costs are thus also affected by firm characteristics such as creditworthiness (Wi) which
R&D, capital investment and dividends whereas Guerard, Bean and Andrews (1987) additionally account
for new debts issue. However, none of these studies explore the role of financial constraints.
4This supply and demand heuristic has also been used by Hubbard (1998) for investments and by
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) to illustrate financing hierarchies for R&D.
5For simplicity, the projects are assumed to be divisible.
6The expected rate of return is derived from the expected benefits less implementation costs.
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depends on collateral as well as capital structure. They increase with the total amount
borrowed.7 Finally, we assume a pecking order, i.e. firms draw first on internal funds
before recoursing to external financing.
MCCi = f(Ii, R
e,o
i , IFi,Wi).
Figure 1 illustrates both the demand and the marginal cost function. Equating MRRi
and MCCi yields the reduced form for optimal investment (I∗i ) in innovation (Grabowski
and Mueller 1972):
I∗ = h(ICi, R
e,o
i , IFi, Xi,Wi).
What happens if additional cash (not signalling any future demand increases) is given
exogenously to firms? Deciding upon investment, exogenous cash is not for free due to
opportunity costs. If a firm can already finance its optimal investment level I∗ fully inter-
nally, additional cash has no effect on its innovation investment. A finding that the firm
does not increase its investment can either indicate that it has faced the same capital costs
for both funds before (as on perfect capital markets) or that capital markets are imperfect
but the firm does not have beneficial innovation opportunities (at the given internal cost of
capital). In any case, such a firm can be defined as financially unconstrained as it pursues
all privately profitable innovation projects at cint (Figure 1a). Area A reflects privately
non-profitable innovation potential8. If innovation investment is stimulated by exogenous
cash flow shocks, we can reject the hypothesis that external and internal capital costs are
the same. A positive expansionary effect from additional cash on innovation investment
can thus be seen as a result from financing constraints that has curtailed firms' innovation
investments at sub-optimal levels (Figure 1b). Area A′ reflects the innovation potential
that would have been invested at internal capital costs cint but that was forgone due to
financing constraints before.
This setting allows us to derive hypotheses about the interplay of innovative capability,
financial resources and financing constraints for innovation. First, we look at innovative
capability. Consider two firms A and B, B having a higher innovative capability than A.
B's ability to generate projects with a higher rate of return or to develop more ideas at
any given rate of return leads to higher financing demand (DB).
7Marginal costs of new equity may be even above marginal costs of borrowing (Fazzari et al. 1988,
Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
8These projects may generate additional social returns that might render them profitable from a
welfare point of view.
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The higher B's innovative capability the more likely it is that additional cash leads to an
expansionary effect (Figure 2a). If both firms cannot originally finance their innovation
from internal funds alone, additional cash increases the innovation investment of both
(Figure 2b). The effect, however, is larger for the firm with higher innovative capability
if both receive the same amount ∆CASHA = ∆CASHB. This holds as long as the slope
of DB is flatter than the one of DA. Areas A and B represent the firms' stock of project
ideas that render unprofitable given the rate of borrowing cext. Additional cash reduces
these costs and thus sets free additional projects (Areas A′ and B′).
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Figure 1: Unconstrained versus constrained firm (Hall 2002)
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Figure 2: Firms with heterogenous innovative capability (own representation)
Second, Figure 3 (a) shows how different levels of available internal financing affect the
likelihood of financing constraints given a certain innovative capability (IFi). Firms A
and B have the same innovative capability, but different levels of internal funds, e.g.
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IFB > IFA. Due to the lower internal liquidity, firm A is assumed to also face higher
costs of external capital than B. This implies that the expansionary effect is stronger for
B even with ∆CASHA = ∆CASHB.
In addition to internal funds the slope of the marginal cost curve in the non-horizontal
part likewise depends on firm characteristics that affect the firm's creditworthiness (Wi),
such as collateral values. For two firms with the same innovative capability and internal
funds, the expansionary effect is larger for the firm facing the larger gap between cint and
cext (Figure 3 (b)).
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Figure 3: Homogenous innovative capability, but different (access to) funds
Based on these theoretical considerations we derive the following hypotheses on financing
constraints for innovation activities:
Hypothesis 1: Given the same level of internal funds, firms with higher innovative ca-
pability should be more likely to be constrained than firms with lower innovative
capability.
Hypothesis 2: Given the same level of innovative capability, firms with lower financial
resources should be more likely to be constrained.
Hypothesis 3: Firms that face a larger gap between cint and cext, should be more likely
to be financially constrained.
Whether the likelihood of being constrained is larger for firms with low IC and low IF
than for firms with high IC and high IF is not clear-cut. It depends on whether lack of
internal financing or innovative capability drives financial constraints.
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Obviously, some of the assumptions of this basic setting are contestable. This particularly
concerns the non-marginal nature of project costs and the information necessary to rank
innovation opportunities appropriately. Furthermore, it is assumed that firms always draw
upon internal funds first. However, firms may pay out the additional cash to shareholders
and raise external capital to leverage the risk to lenders (Jensen and Meckling 1976,
Easterbrook 1984, Jensen 1986).9
4 Empirical Implementation
The following analysis makes use of the 2007 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP). The MIP started in 1993 with the aim to provide representative innovation data
for policy and research purposes. It is the German part of the European-wide Community
Innovation Surveys (CIS) and thus provides internationally comparable data. The target
population covers all firms with at least 5 employees in the German business sector.10
The present study focuses on information of 2,468 firms in manufacturing industries.11
The sample distribution across industries is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
4.1 Measuring Financing Constraints
Following the idea of an ideal experiment suggested by Hall (2008), firms were asked in
the survey to imagine that they receive additional funds amounting to 10% of the firms
last year's turnover. The firms were asked to indicate how they would use this money.
The following six response options were given of which they could choose one or more:
 (additional) investment projects
 (additional) innovation projects
 retention / reserves
 payout to shareholders
9An even "more ideal" test for the degree of financial constraints would be to ask: what would be
the amount a firm would invest if capital markets were perfect? If we assume that the marginal costs of
capital in case of perfect capital markets are the same as the internal marginal costs of capital in imperfect
markets and the amount of additional cash is large enough (exploiting the innovation potential) then the
outcome would be the same as above. If the additional cash is not large enough to undertake all beneficial
projects, firms would still be constrained. In that case we would underestimate the expansionary effect.
But since we only ask wether they would spend additional cash on the different sources and not how
much, our effect goes in the same direction as this more ideal test would go.
10The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas
Institut fuer Sozialforschung and ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research. A detailed description of the survey data can be found in Peters (2008)
11630 observations were deleted from the original data-set due to item non-response or outlier correction.
11
 repayment of debt
This information serves as basis for the derivation of our constraints' indicators.
A firm is considered to be financially constrained if it would invest additional funds in
innovation projects (CON = 1, otherwise CON = 0).
The conceptual set-up allows us to to estimate not only the likelihood of being constrained,
but also the degree to which these constraints affect the firms' innovation investments. We
distinguish three different degrees (TYPE). TYPE = 0 if the firm indicated that it would
not invest in additional innovation projects. Further, TYPE = 1 if the firm would allocate
the money to additional innovation and to at least one of the other options. Finally,
TYPE = 2 if it would invest exclusively in additional innovation projects. Thus, (TYPE)
is an ordinal variable that increases the more binding the firm's financial constraints for
innovation are.
The variables CON and TYPE represent the main dependent variables in our empirical
study. Taking into account that innovation competes with other usages, we additionally
define a set of binary indicators for each of the alternative response options and estimate
a simultaneous multivariate probit model.
4.2 Innovative Capability and Lack of Financing
According to our hypotheses financing constraints are a function of firm liquidity (M ∼
Money) and innovative capability (B ∼ Brain). We distinguish between 6 types of firms
that differ in terms of their innovative capability that can be high (BH) or low (BL) and
their financial resources that can be high (MH), medium (MM) or low (ML).
A firm's ability to generate ideas for innovation depends to a large extent on the knowledge
capital of its employees. This can be measured through formal qualification levels or
through knowledge acquired by training. Hence, we use information on the firm's share
of highly qualified personnel and its expenditure for training of their employees. A firm is
considered to have a high innovative capability (BH) if either the share of highly qualified
personnel or the expenditure on training per employee is larger than the 80th percentile (in
2006).12 Other studies measure innovative capability also by the firm's R&D expenditure
or past innovation success. As our study also involves firms that have not (yet) engaged
in R&D and innovation, we prefer the more general definition above. We check the
12We test the sensitivity of our results by using alternative cut-of-points. Results of this sensitivity
analysis are presented in Table A.4 the Appendix.
12
robustness of our results by using pre-period innovation success and firms' share of R&D
personnel, see section 5.3.
The profit margin defined as earnings before taxation as a share of total sales (in 2006)
is used to measure the availability of internal funds. Originally the profit margin is an
ordinal variable with eight categories that we grouped into three dummy variables (see
Table A.2 in the Appendix). Firms are assumed to have a low financial endowment (ML)
if the profit margin is smaller than zero. If the ratio is larger than zero, but smaller than
7%, the firm exhibits a medium financial background (MM). Finally, MH equals one if
the firm's ratio is at least 7%.
By interacting financial resources and innovative capability we get 6 groups of firms that
differ in their Resource Endowments.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
Innovative Capability
Financial Resources
high medium low
high BHMH BHMM BHML
low BLMH BLMM BLML
4.3 Control Variables
In our estimations we use a set of control variables. First, we account for the amount
of additional funds that firms would receive (CASH). According to prior empirical evi-
dence financial constraints for innovation depend on firm age and size. Firm age (AGE)
is measured in years since founding and firm size (SIZE) is measured by the number of
employees. Since the distributions of SIZE and AGE are highly skewed we take logs of
both variables. We use two proxies for access to external funds. First, capital intensity
reflects firms with relatively high collateral value which should suffer less from financing
constraints. Capital intensity is measured by the value of firms' assets per employee in
2006 (KAPINT). Second, we complemented our survey data with the firms' credit rating
index that we assume to reflect cost of external capital (RATING). The credit rating is
an index between 100 and 600, 100 representing the best rating. The credit rating indica-
tor is a standardized measure provided by Creditreform, Germany's largest credit rating
agency. As intra-group financing flows represent an alternative financing channel, we also
control whether a firm is part of a company group (GROUP).
Being a family-owned company (FAMCOM), that is the majority of stakes belongs to
13
members of one family, may also have effects on financing conditions. On the one hand,
family owned firms may have an advantage in external capital cost since they more often
have a close and long-established relationship with their house bank. On the other hand,
recent empirical evidence has shown that family-owned firms tend to avoid dependency
on external lenders (Peters and Westerheide 2009).
Moreover, we want to take into account the firms' product life cycle patterns (PLC)
as a shorter product life cycle may increase the pressure to develop new products and
hence may increase the need for resources. A shorter product life cycle may also imply
shorter periods for generating returns from prior product innovations. We further include
a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm is located in East Germany (EAST ) to
control for regional differences. Due to extensive R&D subsidy programs targeting East
German firms, these firms were found to face less financing constraints in the 1990s and
early 2000s (Czarnitzki 2006). To take into account differences in the competitive envi-
ronment of the firm we employ a Herfindahl-index (HHI ) of industry sales concentration.
The data are taken from the annual reports of the German Monopolies Commission.
Finally, we cannot rule out that the job function of the respondent may effect the re-
sponse. Hence, we build a set of 5 dummy variables reflecting the respondent's function
within the firm. We distinguish respondents from the general management (CEO), R&D
(R&D_DEP ), financial (FIN_DEP ), sales (SALES_DEP ) and other departments
(OTHER_DEP ).
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
About 36% of the firms in our sample are financially constrained as can be gathered from
the summary statistics in Table 1. Only 5%, however, would invest the full amount of
additional cash in innovation while the large majority would only partially invest in inno-
vation. 68% of the firms would allocate at least part of the money to general investments,
44% would pay out the money to shareholders, 21% would retain the cash and 44% would
rather serve debt. When looking at our main covariates of interest, we see that most
firms (43%) were classified as having a rather low innovative capability while being in a
solid financial situation (BLMM). 18% of firms with low innovative capability are in good
financial situation (BLMH). 33% of all firms were defined as having a high innovative
capability. 4% of those firms have a negative profit-turnover-ratio (BHML). 18% exhibit
14
a solid financial background (BHMM) and 11% are financially well endowed (BHMH).
When looking at the firm characteristics of constrained (CON = 1) and unconstrained
(CON = 0) firms, interesting differences can be inferred from the test in differences in
means. As expected, constrained firms are less capital-intensive, face shorter product life
cycles and are less frequently located in East Germany. At first glance it is surprising
that they are significantly larger in terms of employees, do not differ in terms of age and
have a better credit rating. Moreover, we observe that in the group of constrained firms,
the share of firms with high innovative capability is larger. This is valid independent of
their financial background.13
13See Table A.5 in the Appendix for cross-correlations between the variables.
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5 Econometric Analysis
As section 3 has shown, the degree of financing constraints y∗ depends on financial re-
sources M , innovative capability B, other observable firms characteristics Z as well as
non-observable factors ε14:
y∗ = β0 + β1BHML + β2BHMM + β3BHMH + β4BLML+
β5BLMM + β6BLMH +
∑
k
βkZk + ε. (1)
Z includes the control variables defined in section 4 and a set of 14 industry dummies.
Since we do not directly observe the degree of constraint, we first estimate the likelihood
of being financially constrained by using a probit model. This can be written as
P (CON = 1|X = x) = Φ(x′β),
with X comprising the interaction terms and Z.
According to Hypothesis 1 formulated in section 3, we expect that β1 > β4, β2 > β5 and
β3 > β0. Furthermore, we expect for firms exhibiting the same innovative capability, like
BH , that β1 > β2 > β3 (Hypothesis 2). Finally, Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive coefficient
of the variable capturing creditworthiness as RATING ranges from 1 to 6 with 6 being
the worst rating. Contrarily, capital intensity and group membership should negatively
impact the likelihood of being constrained.
Next, we proxy the degree of constraints by our categorial variable (TYPE) and estimate
ordered Probit models (Greene 2003, 737-738). Finally, we account for the firm's choice
between alternatives of use for the money. We simultaneously estimate multi-equation
Probit models by the method of simulated maximum likelihood to increase efficiency in
our estimation by taking into account the correlation between the different answering
options of the responding firm (Greene 2003, 710-715).
In order to account for heterogeneity and correlation among firms, estimated standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by industries and region (Eastern
vs Western Germany).
14For simplicity, we suppress firm subscripts i.
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5.1 Probit and ordered Probit Models
Table 2 provides the estimation results of 4 different specifications of the probit model
on the likelihood of facing financial constraints. Model 1 presents the base specification
including all variables except those reflecting access to external finance and the amount
of additional cash. We add RATING, KAPINT and GROUP in model 2, CASH in
model 3 and classes for CASH (based on percentiles of the distribution) in model 4. The
latter turns out to be the preferred specification in terms of goodness-of-fit.
The results show that the marginal effects of the interaction terms for firms with a high
innovative capability (BHML, BHMM , BHMH) are all significantly positive, while we do
not observe any significant effects for firms with low innovative capability (BLML and
BLMM , with BLMH being the reference category). Hence, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed:
firms with a high innovative capability are generally more likely to be constrained than
firms with low innovative capability. As the most striking result, it turns out that firms
with low financial resources and low innovative capability (BLML) are not more likely to
be constrained than firms having a rich financial endowment and low innovative capability.
Altogether, this implies that innovative capability and not solely financial resources drives
financing constraints for innovation.
Among firms with high innovative capability, those having low financial resources (BHML)
are more likely to be constrained than firms that have a solid financial background(BHMM ,
BHMH). Tests confirm that the marginal effect is indeed significantly larger for firms
with BHML. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. However, we do not observe a monotonic
relationship as we would have expected. That is, there is no significant difference between
firms with BHMM and BHMH . These results are robust across all 4 specifications.
Accounting for access to external finance, surprisingly we do not find any significant
impact of RATING. The multivariate probit model will shed some light on this variable
in the firms decision-making process. The control variables KAPINT and GROUP show
the expected signs (see section 5.2). A higher capital intensity significantly reduces the
likelihood of facing binding constraints. Being part of a group also exerts a negative, yet
insignificant, effect. The amount of exogenously given CASH turns out to significantly
influence firms' likelihood of investing additional cash in innovation projects. To check
for any non-linear effects of additional cash, we additionally construct five categories for
CASH on the basis of the 20, 40, 60 and 80th percentile of the distribution.15 As can be
15The average amount of CASH in class 1 is about 58,000 e, in class 2 about 206,600 e, in class 3
about 645,000 e, in class 4 about 2.1 million e and 47 million e in class 5. The lowest category serves as
18
seen in specification 4, the positive effect is increasing with the size of the hypothetical
payment. The effect of CASH doubles from class 3 to class 4 indicating a critical size of
the payment of about roughly 1 million e that significantly increases the likelihood of new
innovation projects. After controlling for CASH firm size turns out to be insignificant.
Interestingly, family-owned firms seem to be more willing to spend this additional cash on
innovation than non-family-owned firms. For the duration of the product life cycle and
firms' age, we do not find any effects.16 Moreover, it is noteworthy that we do not find
any significant differences between the response patterns of R&D-managers and CEOs.
Therefore, we do not expect a bias towards new innovation projects resulting from R&D-
managers answering the questionnaire. Only if the survey has been answered by the
financial department we observe a lower likelihood of spending additional cash in new
innovation projects. Finally it should be noted that we test for heteroscedasticity and
normality of our explanatory variables (Verbeek 2000, p.168). The test statistics show
that homoscedasticity and normality cannot be rejected in any of our models.
Table 3 shows the results of the ordered probit model.17 The first and second column
present the coefficients and standard errors of the model and columns three to eight
show the marginal effects and standard errors of the likelihood of the different outcomes
of TY PE. Outcome 2 indicates the most constrained firms as they would invest the
full amount solely in innovation. Outcome 1 reflects that firms would partly invest in
innovation. Outcome 0 means that firms indicated that they would not conduct any
additional innovation projects.
The ordered model by and large confirms our previous results. Regarding the degree of
constraints, firms with a high innovative capability but low financial resources exhibit a
likelihood of being constrained in terms of outcome 1 that is 19 percentage points higher
than for the reference group. For outcome 2 the effect of 3 percentage points for BHML
may appear small at first glance. However, given that only 5% of the firms in the sample
would invest the full amount in additional innovation, the effect is comparatively high.
reference category. The maximum hypothetical payment of 4.4 billion e (see descriptive statistics) is no
data error but refers to a large company in the energy sector. We ran all our models with this company
excluded from the data which did not significantly alter the results.
16We tested different forms of AGE, such as non-logged or age classes. Further, we tried non-linear
specifications. AGE did not turn out to be significant in any of these alternative specifications. However,
the survey is representative for firms with at least 5 employees. This implies that a large proportion of
very young firms does not belong to the target population.
17It should be noted that the condition µ2 > µ1 > 0 necessary for all probabilities to be positive is
fulfilled.
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5.2 Multivariate Probit Model
To account for the rivalry in the usage of additional cash, we estimate a multivariate
probit model in the next step. This involves simultaneous estimation of five equations
for the decision to invest in physical capital, in innovation, to build reserves, to payout
to shareholder or to repay debts. Table A.3 in the Appendix presents the correlation
coefficients between the five equations.18 The table reveals significant correlation between
most of the error terms indicating that the equations should be indeed estimated simul-
taneously. Table 4 presents the results from the multi-equation probit model. We enrich
the specification by including firms' legal form (PUBLIC and LIMITED, PIV ATE
serves as references category) as it may affect payouts to shareholders, for example. The
results for investing in additional innovation projects remain nearly unchanged due to this
change in specification. Interestingly, our main variables of interest show a fundamentally
different pattern in the decision to invest in physical capital. Having a low innovative
capability leads to a higher likelihood of choosing additional investments, the effect being
highest for BLML. Firms with high innovative capability and low financial resources have
a lower likelihood of using the additional money for building reserves than other firms.
The results from equation 4 illustrate that all firms are less likely to distribute the cash to
their shareholders than the reference group of firms that have a low innovative capability
and rich financial resources.
In contrast to the innovation decision, the decision to serve debt is to a large extent driven
by the financial background. For both, high and low innovative capability, the likelihood
of serving debt rises with decreasing liquidity. That is, we observe the largest effects for
BLML and BHML. This is in line with the results found for RATING. Firms with a
worse RATING have a higher probability of serving debt. These firms seems to give
priority to consolidating their financial reputation before investing in new projects.
Interestingly, R&D managers turn out to be more willing to pay out the cash than CEOs.
Moreover, public and limited firms are more likely to distribute cash to their shareholders.
Estimates for firms belonging to a group suggest that they are generally less constrained:
They are less likely to pursue additional investment projects and have a lower propensity
to pay back debts.
18The variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms has values of 1 on the leading
diagonal, and the off-diagonal elements are correlations to be estimated ρji = ρij, and ρii = 1, for all
i = 1, ...,M
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5.3 Alternative Measures for Innovative Capability and Robust-
ness Checks
The previous sections pointed out the important role of innovative capability for financ-
ing constraints. Admittedly, we cannot observe innovative capability directly. To test the
robustness of our results, we employ alternative proxies for innovative capability. First,
we measure innovative capability by the same variables, but use different cut-off-points
(mean, median and 90th percentile of both highly qualified personnel and expenses for
training of employees) or measure it relative to the respective industry distribution. The
results are robust within a broad range of cut-off-definitions, as can be gathered from
Table A.4 in the Appendix. Second, we employ three alternative variables to define inno-
vative capability. We begin with using only the share of highly qualified personnel (not
accounting for training). Next, we test a stricter definition of innovation-related human
capital by using the share of R&D employees. For these two checks the original 80%
cut-off-point is applied. Finally, we define innovative capability based on successful inno-
vation projects in the past. More precisely, we observe if the firm has introduced at least
one new product to the market in the pre-survey period. Table 5 summarizes the results
from this exercise. Hypothesis 1 is generally confirmed. The main difference with respect
to Hypothesis 2 is a significant non-linear effect of financial resources for firms with high
innovative capability.
A second concern which may arise is that the results of the quasi-experiment depend
on the fact whether a firm was already engaged in innovation activities. Hence, we
estimate a two-stage selection model for both CON and TY PE. The first stage describes
whether the firm has been innovative in the past two years (INNO).19 The selection
model hinges upon at least one valid exclusion restriction. We expect the firms' export
intensity (EXINT ) and the diversification of its product portfolio (DIV ERS) to affect
the likelihood to innovate, while it should not impact the likelihood to face financial
constraints. Hence, we use both variables as exclusion restriction in the first stage.20
From Table 6 we see that DIV ERS and EXINT are indeed highly significant in Stage 1.
Furthermore, firm size, group membership and seller concentration stimulates innovation,
19INNO takes the value one if the firm either had a product or process innovation, or has ongoing
or abandoned innovation activities in the period 2004-2006 or has planned to start such activities in the
near future. The variable takes the value of zero if none of this was the case.
20Admittedly, we cannot test the validity of the exclusion restrictions, however, it turns out that
DIV ERS and EXINT were not significant in any regression of financial constraints (CON or TY PE).
24
whereas the effect of firms' age is negative.
However, the likelihood-ratio-test does not reject the hypothesis of independence of stage
1 and 2. Thus, selectivity does not seem to play a role here. Consequently, the results do
not change considerably compared to the models presented in section 5.1.
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6 Conclusion
In imperfect capital markets financing conditions for innovation activities may be one
reason for welfare reducing under-investment in innovation projects. Firms with limited
internal funds may have to leave some of their innovation projects on the shelf due to
restricted access to external financing. Such projects would be profitable at the internal
rate of return, but are not rewarding given the 'risk-premium' on the cost of external
capital.
This article contributes to the literature on financing constraints for innovation in three
ways. First, a new approach of measuring financial constraints is introduced. In a quasi-
experiment firms were asked to indicate how they would spend exogenously given cash.
We interpret a positive expansionary effect from additional cash on innovation projects
as the result from financing constraints that curtail these firms' innovation investments
at sub-optimal levels. The data allows us not only to estimate the likelihood of being
constrained but also the degree to which these constraints affect the firms' innovation
investments. This distinction is derived from the information whether firms would invest
the full amount or only parts of it in additional innovation projects. By using multivariate
probit models, we secondly take into account that the decision to engage in innovation
projects is part of the firms' overall optimization process. Third, we derive a framework
that attributes financing constraints not only to the lack of financial resources but also
to the firms' innovative capability.
Our econometric analysis by and large supports the hypotheses that financial constraints
hold back innovation activities. Firms with higher innovative capability are more likely
to have unexploited innovation projects, independent of their financial background (Hy-
pothesis 1). Our results further show that firms with high innovative capability and low
levels of internal funds are more likely to be constrained in their innovation activities than
their more liquid counterparts (Hypothesis 2). On the other hand, our main variables of
interest show a fundamentally different pattern in the decision to invest in physical capi-
tal. Having a low innovative capability leads to a higher likelihood of choosing additional
investments. To sum up, firms with high innovative capability but low financial resources
are most likely to be constrained. We also observe constraints for financially sound firms
that may have to put some of their ideas on the shelf. In a nutshell, financial constraints
do not depend on the availability of internal funds per se, but are driven by innovative
capability through increasing resource requirements.
28
Firms that face a larger gap between internal and external cost of capital, for example
due to lower overall collateral values, should be more likely to be financially constrained.
This is supported by the significant effect of a low capital intensity on the likelihood and
the degree of being constrained (Hypothesis 3). The multidimensional analysis reveals
that in contrast to the innovation decision, the decision to serve debt is to a large extent
driven by the financial background. Firms with low internal funds or a bad credit rating
would primarily repay debt instead of investing additional cash in additional innovation
projects.
Interestingly, we see that family-owned businesses are more likely to invest additional cash
in innovation projects than firms with other ownership structures. This may, however,
indicate that these firms have a general preference for internal financing. Future analysis
will be directed to these issues. In particular, we expect that family-run firms would
answer differently, if not cash, but loans at a comparatively low interest rate would have
been offered. Hence, further analysis will address the fact how much the results generally
depend on the fact that the question offers cash only.
From a policy point of view, we can conclude that a significant portion of firms is fi-
nancially constrained, particularly firms with high innovation capability. Hence, policy
should stimulate the provision of risk-taking external capital and provide public funding.
If innovative capability is the driving force behind financing constraints, policy should
regard innovative capability as an important criterion for supporting private investment
in innovation. Either project selection or granting tax credits should account for such
factors as they reflect the firms' ability to set free unexploited innovation potential and
turn ideas into innovative products or processes.
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Table A.2: Profit-Margin Categories (2,468 obs.)
Profit-margin Frequency % Cum. Category
1 <0% 272 11.02 11.02 ML
2 0%-<2% 419 16.98 28.00 MM
3 2%-<4% 467 18.92 46.92 MM
4 4%-<7% 604 24.47 71.39 MM
5 7%-<10% 348 14.10 85.49 MH
6 10%-<15% 209 8.47 93.96 MH
7 >=15% 149 6.04 100.00 MH
Total 2,468 100.00
Table A.3: Correlation (rho) between equations in MV-probit (2,468 obs.)
equ1 equ2 equ3 equ4
equ2 0.567 (0.029)
equ3 -0.165 (0.033) -0.115 (0.034)
equ4 -0.310 (0.036) -0.243 (0.038) 0.117 (0.037)
equ5 -0.236 (0.033) -0.100 (0.034) 0.020 (0.033) 0.033 (0.038)
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8 Supplemental Material
This study made use of a direct indicator of financial constraints. To test whether this
indicator really captures what we expect it to do, we conduct an admittedly rough test of
the validity of the survey-based constraint indicator (CON). For this purpose we estimate
the sensitivity of firms' R&D investments to the availability of internal funds and to the
access to external funds for both the group of potentially constrained (CON = 1) and
unconstrained firms (CON = 0). We expect a higher sensitivity for firms in the group of
firms that were categorized as constrained (CON = 1). We use a comparable specification
as Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2009a,b) who use the same data-set (MIP). They find higher
sensitivities for firms with cutting-edge R&D and for smaller firms, respectively. While
the latter studies employ panel data techniques, we are restricted to the 2007 cross-section
that provides our constraint measure CON . That is, we estimate Tobit models on the
following R&D equation
ln(R&D) = β0 + β1ASSETS + β2ASSETS
2 + β3AGE + β4COMP + β5PCM+
10∑
k=6
βkRATINGc +
24∑
l=11
βlIND. (2)
For comparability reasons, we also measure internal liquidity by the empirical price-cost-
margin PCM .21 Access to external funds is again measured by the credit rating index
(RATING). We distinguish 5 rating classes based on the distribution of RATING, each
class covering 20 percent of the distribution. We control for firms' size measured by fixed
assets (ASSETS), age of the firm (AGE), market (seller) concentration (COMP) and
industry. To avoid direct simultaneity, we use lagged values for all time-variant explana-
tory variables.
As the survey question on which our constraint measure refers to the term 'innovation
projects' rather than R&D projects, we test the robustness of our findings using innova-
tion expenditure (INNOINV ) as dependent variable as well. In addition to R&D outlays,
innovation expenditure comprises acquisition of new (lab) equipment that is linked to an
21The MIP data does not provide any information on cashflow. Hence, the authors calculate an
approximation for the availability of internal funds (PCM) as PCM = (Sales - Staff Cost - Material Cost
+ δR&D)/Sales. This approach has been widely used in the literature (see Collins and Preston 1969,
Ravenscraft 1983 for the seminal papers). Since R&D is an expense, the decision to invest in R&D will
decrease PCM in the corresponding period. As we want to measure internally available funds during the
year irrespective of the actual investment decision, it is common to add the R&D expenses back into
PCM (cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not account for capital cost, the staff and material cost shares of
R&D are added back. These amount to 93% (δ = 0.93) according to the official German R&D statistic.
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innovation project, the purchase of other intellectual property (e.g. patents or licenses),
expenditure which become necessary for training employees when implementing new tech-
nologies, marketing costs for a new product, as well as design, prototyping and related
activities.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table S.1 present the results in terms of marginal effects for the R&D
equation and columns 3 and 4 for the innovation equation, respectively. In the R&D equa-
tion, internal liquidity is significant for the firms classified as constrained (CON = 1),
but not for the firms with CON = 0. Innovation expenditure increases significantly with
an increase in internal liquidity in both groups, but the effect is significantly larger in
the group CON = 1. We further find that firms that have a worse credit rating than
the firms in the top 20th percentile (which serves as reference group) spend less on R&D
and innovation. The negative sign for the second worst and third worst rating classes is
observed for both CON = 0 and CON = 1. However, the marginal effect is larger for
the latter group22.
The results of this rough check can be interpreted as confirming that the survey-based
measure of financing restrictions derived for innovation indeed captures liquidity con-
straints.
22Concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of the credit rating have been discussed in detail in
Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2009a).
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